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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<tr>
<td>11:11:45</td>
<td>Registration (outside Blandford Hall)</td>
<td>H-127</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:45-12</td>
<td>Welcome (Blandford Hall)</td>
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<td>12-12:55</td>
<td><strong>History of Philosophy</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: Kevin Harrelson (Ball State University)**&lt;br&gt;A Critical Examination of Plato’s Developed Account of Knowledge (KPA Undergrad Prize)&lt;br&gt;Taylor Shofner (Centre)&lt;br&gt;John Winstead (Western Kentucky)</td>
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<td>12-12:55</td>
<td>Epistemology&lt;br&gt;Chair: Kris Rhodes (Western Governor’s Univ)**&lt;br&gt;Limiting Phenomenal Conservatism&lt;br&gt;Adam Hayden (IUPUI)&lt;br&gt;Jeffrey Dunn (DePauw)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:55-2:15</td>
<td>Break with Refreshments</td>
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<td>2:15-3:10</td>
<td><strong>Philosophy of Mind and Language</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)**&lt;br&gt;Consciousness and Cognitive Individuation&lt;br&gt;Philip Woodward (Indiana)&lt;br&gt;Blakely Phillips (Indiana)</td>
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<td>2:15-3:10</td>
<td>Feminism&lt;br&gt;Chair: Sarah Vitale (Ball State University)**&lt;br&gt;Types, Tokens, Brands: Credibility Excess as an Epistemic Virtue&lt;br&gt;Emmalon Davis (Indiana)&lt;br&gt;Sarah Neal Adams (Indiana)</td>
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<td>3:15-4:10</td>
<td>Solving the Problem of Compositionality for Dynamic Fregian Thoughts&lt;br&gt;Speaker: Blakely Phillips (Indiana)&lt;br&gt;Comments: Philip Woodward (Indiana)</td>
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<td>3:15-4:10</td>
<td>The Object of Patriarchal Love&lt;br&gt;Rachel McNealis (Miami)&lt;br&gt;Eva Cadavid (Centre)</td>
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<td>4:15-5:10</td>
<td>Understanding Assertion to Understanding Silencing&lt;br&gt;Speaker: David Spewak (Mississippi State)&lt;br&gt;Comments: Courtland Lewis (Owensboro CTC)</td>
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<td>4:15-5:10</td>
<td>Against Minimal Marriage&lt;br&gt;Sarah Neal Adams (Indiana)&lt;br&gt;James William Lincoln (Kentucky)</td>
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<td>5:10-5:20</td>
<td>Break</td>
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<td>5:20-6:45</td>
<td><strong>Keynote Address in Blandford Hall</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Character as a Mode of Evaluation”&lt;br&gt;Kate Abramson&lt;br&gt;Indiana University</td>
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<td>7-9</td>
<td>Dinner (to be arranged informally after the session)</td>
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### Saturday, 11 April

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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>8:15-9</td>
<td><strong>Registration</strong> <em>(continental breakfast outside Blandford Hall)</em></td>
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| 9-9:55 | **Freedom and Responsibility**<br>
Chair: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw) | **Aristotle**<br>Chair: Eva Cadavid (Centre) |
| Speaker: Robert Hartman (Saint Louis)<br>Comments: James William Lincoln (Kentucky) | Aristotle’s Clincher<br>Jeremy Kirby (Albion)<br>Charlene Elsby (IPFW) |
| 10-10:55 | **Spinoza’s Explanation for the Feeling of Freedom**<br>Speaker: Galen Barry (Virginia)<br>Comments: Sydney Penner (Asbury) | Being and Truth: Aristotle and Future Contingents *(IPA Undergrad Prize)*<br>Aaron Thieme (IPFW)<br>Nathan Muncy (Indiana University Southeast) |
| 11-11:55 | **Pruss’s Libertarianism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason**<br>Speaker: Brandon Rzdak (Purdue)<br>Comments: Samuel Kahn (IUPUI) | Posthumous Fortune and Well-Being<br>Rory Goggins (Murray State)<br>Kate Johnson (Bellarmine University) |
| 12:1-1:45 | **Lunch on Your Own and Business Meeting** |                                                 |
| 1:45-2 | **Student Awards Presentation** *(Blandford Hall)* | **Ethics and Politics**<br>Chair: Eva Cadavid (Centre) |
| 2-2:55 | **Kant**<br>Chair: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast) | **Should Physicians Be Empathetic**<br>David Schwan (Bowling Green)<br>Reyes Espinoza (Purdue) |
| Speaker: Jerome Langguth (Thomas More)<br>Comments: Matthew Pianalto (Eastern Kentucky) |                                                 |
| 3-3:55 | **A Kantian Reply To Those Who Think Philosophy Is Dead**<br>Speaker: Caroline Buchanan (Kentucky)<br>Comments: Courtland Lewis (Owensboro CTC) | An Ecology of Politics, A History of Nature: Arendt and Leopold<br>Michael Reno (Western Kentucky)<br>W. David Hall (Centre) |
| 4-4:55 | **Kant and the Duty to Promote One’s Own Happiness**<br>Speaker: Samuel Kahn (IUPUI)<br>Comments: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw) | **Teaching Asian Philosophy Panel**<br>Chair: Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast)<br>“The Dao of Teaching Chinese Philosophy: Lessons from a Survey”<br>Manyul Im (Bridgeport)<br>A. Minh Nguyen (Eastern Kentucky)<br>Brandon Harwood (Univ of Louisville) |

**IPA Executive Officers 2014-2015**

- **President:** Bryan Hall, Indiana University Southeast
- **Vice President:** Kevin Harrelson, Ball State University
- **Secretary:** Kris Rhodes, Western Governors University
Abstracts of Presented Papers

Aesthetic Disappointment in Danto and Kant
Jerome J Langguth, Thomas More College

This paper compares and critically evaluates Danto and Kant on the theme of aesthetic disappointment. By ‘aesthetic disappointment’ I mean the experience of sudden and irreversible loss of admiration for and appreciation of a given beautiful object or work of art. I conclude that Kant and Danto are actually much closer in their accounts of aesthetics disappointment, and thus aesthetic appreciation, than one would initially suppose. Both contend that prolonged interested engagement with a given object of appreciation requires conceptual or reflective preparation of some kind, both make a clear distinction between finding something beautiful and sustained appreciation of it, and both claim that being deceived about the origins of an admired work or object leads to aesthetic disappointment.

Against Minimal Marriage
Sarah Neal Adams, Indiana University

Minimal marriage is a reformation of marriage law provided by Elizabeth Brake as a response to feminist concerns about marriage. Brake presents minimal marriage as an ideal account of marriage for the political liberalist, justified by the thought that marriage sanctions and protects adult care networks, which are a primary good. She also justifies her account by claiming that it will provide a way for the state rectify past injustices of marriage. In this paper, I argue that her justifications are inadequate for an ideal account of marriage, and that marriage abolition would be more ideal, both to the political liberalist and the feminist.

Aristotle’s Clincher: 1006b28-1006b34
Jeremy Kirby, Albion College

Aristotle provides a modal argument, in book four of the Metaphysics, 1006b28-1006b34, against an interlocutor who would deny that no subject admits of contradictory predications. Following R.M. Dancy (1975), I’ll call this argument “the Clincher,” and the principle it is designed to defend “the PNC.” I’ll offer a reading that respects the dialectical context and addresses the major exegetical difficulties.

Being and truth: Aristotle and Future Contingents (IPA Undergraduate Prize Winner)
Aaron C. Thieme, IPFW

In this paper I will examine the relation between being, truth, the principle of bivalence, determinism, and particular, future contingents. I will argue that particular, future contingents are either true or false and, nevertheless, that determinism is false. In arguing for this, first, I will address the meaning of and Aristotle’s perspective on the law of excluded middle, the principle of bivalence, and determinism. Second, I will introduce the problem of future contingents and examine Aristotle’s treatment. Third, I will show that Aristotle’s account of the problem of future contingents errs; in particular, I will contend that Aristotle is wrong to suppose that the truth of a proposition entails the existential necessity of the proposition’s denoted state of affairs.

Compatibilism and the Luck Objection
Robert Hartman, Saint Louis University

The way in which luck shapes our moral lives is disturbing. Some philosophers also believe that luck universally undermines responsibility-level control. While these philosophers typically have in mind libertarian moral responsibility, Neil Levy argues that luck always undermines compatibilist responsibility-level control. His argument called ‘the Luck Pincer’ goes roughly like this: all acts are lucky,
luck undermines moral responsibility, and thus no one is morally responsible for an act. The goal of this essay is to argue that the Luck Pincer is unsound. I argue first that the premise all acts are lucky is subject to a class of counterexamples. Subsequently, I revise the Luck Pincer with a more modest premise so that it circumvents those counterexamples. Even so, the Revised Luck Pincer is either unsound or otiose, because either the premise that luck undermines moral responsibility is false or the argument is sound in a way that produces no genuinely skeptical conclusion.

Consciousness and Cognitive Individuation
Philip Woodward, Indiana University

A number of philosophers have recently argued that cognitive phenomena are either exhaustively functionally individuated or else partially phenomenally individuated, but that some cognitive phenomena cannot be exhaustively functionally individuated, and hence that some are phenomenally individuated. I discuss the following four individuation-problems: (1) that which determines which content a state has; (2) that which determines which subject a mind belongs to; (3) that which determines a state’s status as mental; (4) and that which determines a system’s status as cognitive. I argue that while there are promising functionalist solutions to each of the first three individuation problems, all three solutions turn on whether there is a solution to the fourth problem, but that there is no solution to the fourth problem. I conclude that consciousness plays a pervasive role in the individuation of cognitive phenomena.

A Critical Examination of Plato’s Developed Account of Knowledge (KPA Undergraduate Prize Winner)
Taylor Shofner, Centre College

In his works, The Meno, Phaedo and The Republic, Plato uses the historical Socrates to demonstrate his view that one cannot learn or acquire knowledge, only recollect it. His account is examined within all three works but is most thoroughly investigated within The Meno. This paper relies on the recollection process laid out in The Meno to explain the accounts of knowledge Plato proposes in The Phaedo and The Republic. In this paper I will argue that Plato’s work in The Phaedo and The Republic are merely extensions of the process of recollection presented within The Meno and do not present any new theories or contradictions.

The Dao of Teaching Chinese Philosophy: Lessons from a Survey
Manyul Im, University of Bridgeport and A. Minh Nguyen, Eastern Kentucky University

What are the challenges that instructors face in teaching Chinese philosophy to Western students? How are they to be overcome? How can we integrate Chinese thought into our philosophy curriculum to make it more inclusive? One potentially valuable source of insight into these issues is the opinions of those who have taught Chinese philosophy to Western students. From May 2009 to December 2010, one of the authors of this proposal asked instructors of Chinese philosophy from all over the world to complete an anonymous questionnaire that contained ten open-ended questions. Eighty-three such instructors, mostly from North America, responded. The aim of our paper is to share the data collected and to discuss the lessons that can be drawn from them.

An Ecology of Politics, A History of Nature: Arendt and Leopold
Michael J Reno, Western Kentucky University

Though Arendt never offers a lengthy treatment of environmental issues or the concept of nature, her approach to politics provides insights into nature. And, thinking through environmental issues clarifies an Arendtian approach to politics. Through a close reading—one which is sensitive to the relationship between judgment and action, the role of art, and the necessity of memory in Arendt’s thinking—politics
and action can be extended in a way that accounts for the environment and nature in the realm of action. First, I explicate Arendt’s account of the labor and work. Second, I examine the third realm of human activity, action. The parallels between Arendt’s characterizations of nature and politics form the starting point for the third section. There, through an examination of some of Leopold’s views, I show that Arendt’s thinking about action and politics is more amenable to environmental thinking than it appears at first glance.

Ryan Pollock, Penn State University

Hutcheson’s criticism of Hume’s Treatise for lacking “Warmth in the Cause of Virtue” lead Hume to revise the final version. Most commentators do not find these revisions to be philosophically substantive. I contend, however, that the Treatise contains a more substantive response to the “cause of virtue” criticism. I begin by outlining the historical background and significance of this criticism before turning to Hume’s response in the Treatise. While Hutcheson believes that Hume’s attempt to explain our moral sense naturalistically makes it seem artificial, Hume believes that his sympathy-based account of the moral sense shows that morality arises from human “generosity” and “capacity” thus causing us to approve of the origin of morality. I then address Hume’s yet to be appreciated claim that this theory serves the “cause of virtue” better than Hutcheson, and provide two reasons why Hume may have held this.

Kant and the Duty to Promote One’s Own Happiness
Samuel Kahn, IUPUI

In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for “this happens unavoidably” (MS, AA 06:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness.

A Kantian Reply to Those Who Think Philosophy Is Dead
Caroline Buchanan, University of Kentucky

Philosophy’s relationship with science has become complicated. When Stephen Hawking said in 2011 that “philosophy is dead,” he voiced a thought we have all likely encountered among our students and peers. In 2014, Neil DeGrasse Tyson echoed the sentiment, explaining that philosophy has lost its academic footing to the scientific method, and that eventually, all subject matter once thought to be the realm of ‘philosophy’ will be rightly understood as best investigated through empirical investigation. The task of this paper is to provide a response to Hawking and Tyson that places philosophy within our 21st century attitude toward science and knowledge. I will argue that philosophy does have an important role to play in understanding human experience, and that this role is a permanent one legitimatized not by the temporary shortcomings of science but rather by clear limitations on the nature of empirical knowledge. I will support my claim by turning to Kant, whose work is a paradigmatic example of philosophy critically limiting itself alongside scientific investigation.

Limiting Phenomenal Conservatism
Adam Hayden, IUPUI

Michael Huemer endorses a principle of epistemic justification he calls phenomenal conservatism; on this view, in the absence of defeaters, a subject is at least some degree justified in believing the world is, as it seems. Recently, Huemer introduced inferential seemings to expand his version of phenomenal conservatism to accommodate inferential justification. In this paper I raise two problems for inferential
seemings: first, they are causally inefficacious as belief justifiers; and second, if their causal efficacy is maintained, inferential seemings lead to massive underdetermination. I go on to raise a further problem for Huemer’s version of phenomenal conservatism: ordinary (non-inferential) seemings are poor grounds for basing theoretical beliefs. Neither inferential nor ordinary seemings have a role to play in inferential justification. After analysis, what will be left is a version of phenomenal conservatism restricted to a principle of justification for non-inferential beliefs involving medium-sized physical objects.

Molinism, Truthmaking, and Epistemology
Allen Gehring, Brescia University

Molinism attempts to explain how God can have meticulous sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge while creatures exercise libertarian freedom. This theory hinges on positing the existence of various counterfactual truths prior to creation. Philosophers debate whether these truths fall prey to a truthmaking objection. I develop a new way to frame this objection that draws on the epistemic considerations wrapped up with truthmaking.

The Object of Patriarchal Love: Romantic Mythologies and the Actualization of Authentic Love
Rachel McNealis, Miami University

In her text The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir offers an optimistic notion of an authentic love; however, Beauvoir is not completely explicit of this notion of love’s potential to be actualized. Although she presents theoretical requirements at the end of her chapter depicting a caricature she calls the woman in love, her following chapter presenting a notion of the independent woman illustrates a struggle to maintain a mindset from which authentic love can occur. I argue that by looking at Sigmund Freud’s article, “On Narcissism”, in which Freud offers an understanding of the state of love, one can see how the internalization of gender norms from infancy is to be credited with the struggle of the independent woman to maintain this mindset. It is from this idealization of gender roles that one can understand the inescapability of the mindset of the woman in love, despite the attempt to at self-actualization through other means, and which marks Beauvoir’s notion of authentic love as an impossibility in such a culture.

Posthumous Fortune and Well-Being
Rory Goggins, Murray State University

Should events that occur after a person’s death play a role in an assessment of that person’s life? Aristotle constructs a viewpoint on this issue that represents an important alternative within the contemporary debate. On the one hand, he accepts the notion that there are such things as posthumous fortunes. However, what sets him apart from others who accept this notion is that he thinks death finalizes our assessment of a person’s life. I will refer to this notion as the finality of death: provided that the basis of our assessment is accurate and sufficient for the purpose, our general assessment of a person’s life will not change after that person’s death, even if there are posthumous events that are relevant to our assessment. In this paper, I will defend an Aristotelean account of posthumous harm.

Pruss’s Libertarianism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Brandon Rdzak, Purdue University

If libertarian free choices involve contingent brute facts, neither Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) nor his account of libertarianism is right. But Pruss wants to have his cake and eat it, too. He denies that there are contingent brute facts while at the same time affirming explicable free choices; he affirms PSR and holds to so-called “almost” self-explanatory contingent true propositions, which are crucial to his reconciliation of libertarianism with PSR. But something has to give. After expounding Pruss’s view, I argue that his proposal of almost self-explanatory
contingent true propositions is implausible and that, as a result, Pruss should concede that his account involves contingent brute facts, in which case both his libertarianism and PSR are mistaken. I also present what I take to be Pruss’s best response to my criticism, followed by my reply. I conclude that Pruss’s response isn’t successful.

Should Physicians Be Empathetic
David Schwan, Bowling Green State University

The role and importance of empathy in medical practice continues to be widely discussed. Proponents of empathy in medical practice argue that empathy plays a crucial role in the physician-patient relationship, fostering better communication, treatment, and patient satisfaction. Critics argue that this form of engagement with the affective lives of patients impedes effective medical treatment, since it exposes physicians to increased vicarious suffering (producing ‘compassion fatigue’) and increases their susceptibility to error. I will outline a number of versions of this objection and give a number of reasons (both philosophical and empirical) to doubt this claim. Further, I will argue that there are good reasons to promote affectively engaged approaches (like clinical empathy) to doctor-patient care.

Solving the Problem of Compositionality for Dynamic Fregean Thoughts
Blakely Phillips, Indiana University

Evans and Frege suggest that the same indexical/demonstrative thought is expressible in different words, which suggest different senses; but Frege also holds that thoughts are composed of senses, so that a difference in the senses of which two thoughts are composed ought to yield a difference in the thoughts. The Principle of Compositionality seems to be at odds with dynamic Fregean thoughts: I will call this the Problem of Compositionality. In this paper I propose related solutions to two different manifestations of this problem: the first to do with indexical reference to times, the second to do with self-reference.

Spinoza’s Explanation for the Feeling of Freedom
Galen Barry, University of Virginia

The feeling of freedom is the immediate representation of freedom that we experience when we act. When we act, we feel as though we could perform any number of actions. Many philosophers in the early modern period—for example, Descartes, Clarke, and Reid—take the feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. This paper examines Spinoza’s account of the feeling. I argue that, on Spinoza’s account, the feeling of freedom is nothing but a vacillation of the mind which we then project onto action. The vacillation is the result of associating too many kinds of actions with a given emotional state. When we act, the mind alternates back and forth between the kinds of actions it can perform. This vacillation is then treated not as the subjective feature of the mind that it really is, but instead as an objective feature of our actions, namely the power to do otherwise.

Types, Tokens, Brands: Credibility Excess as an Epistemic Vice
Emmalon Davis, Indiana University

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this paper, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. In Section 1, I offer a brief analysis of Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice as credibility deficit, laying out Fricker’s reasons for dismissing credibility excess as a central form of testimonial injustice. In Section 2, I consider interpersonal and institutional cases in which marginalized individuals are overly-esteemed qua knowers, where such inflated assessments are motivated by identity-prejudice and harm targets in their capacities as knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I argue that these cases meet Fricker’s criteria for testimonial injustice.
injustice and so constitute central cases of the vice. In Section 3, I propose an amendment to Fricker’s virtue of testimonial justice. I argue that the virtue of testimonial justice is more appropriately understood as a mean between two extremes—whereby attempts to neutralize bias in one’s credibility assessments must be sensitized not only to prejudicial deficit but to prejudicial excess as well.

**Understanding Assertion to Understand Silencing**
David Spewak, Mississippi State University

Rae Langton made many philosophers aware of how speech-acts may be silenced by preventing hearers from recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. However, recent investigations have revealed that silencing can occur even when a speaker’s intentions are recognized by hearers. In particular this arises where there is what Miranda Fricker has called testimonial injustice, specifically in those injustices resulting from negative identity prejudice arising from stereotypes relating to race, gender, and class. I argue that only the correct account of assertion can explain the silencing of speakers like those Fricker discusses. The argument proceeds by looking at two accounts of assertion, assertion as defined by its constitutive norm(s) and assertion as undertaking a commitment in reasoned discourse (the dialectical account). After looking at both accounts, I argue that the dialectical account of assertion better explains silencing as a result of testimonial injustice than the constitutive norm approach.

**Why the Present is not a Special Gift to A-Theory Presentists (KPA Undergraduate Second Prize Winner)**
John Winstead, Western Kentucky

The goal of this essay is to show that Zimmerman’s account of presentism (only the present exists) can be subsumed by a growing block theory (Both the past and the present exist) of time. Zimmerman posits in his essay The Privileged Present: Defending an ‘A-Theory’ of Time that commonsense language can determine the truth of presentism. I will show that given commonsense language as our starting point that all of the conceptual problems presentism has to contend with, growing block theory can address. The argument I present is not necessarily an endorsement of growing block theory, rather I mean only to show that any theory of presentism based on commonsense language must commit itself to the existence of the past in order to stay consistent, and thus become a growing block theory of time.