



Indiana Philosophical Association

Spring 2014 Meeting at Butler University in Indianapolis, 21-22 March 2014
Gallahue Hall (Friday) and Jordan Hall (Saturday)

Meeting Program

Friday, 21 March	Session A 101 Gallahue Hall	Session B 102 Gallahue Hall
11-11:45	<i>Registration</i>	
11:45-12	<i>Welcome</i>	
	Special Session: Feminism Chair: Bernd Buldt (IPFW)	Epistemology Chair: Stuart Glennan (Butler University)
12-12:55	“Unconcealing Degas’ Dancers in Blue” Speaker: Stephanie Lee (University of Toledo) Commenter: Samantha Ooley (IUPUI)	“Modality and Mousetraps: Evolution and Accessibility” Jason Zinser (University of Wisconsin) Ioan Muntean (Univ of Notre Dame – Reilly Ctr)
1-1:55	“A Foucauldian-Feminist Ethics of Care” Speaker: Richard Lynch (DePauw University) Commenter: Frank Schwarzkopf (IUPUI)	“Higher-Order Belief Views of Justified Suspended Judgment” Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis) Jared Bates (Hanover College)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break with Refreshments</i>	
	Special Session: Continental Philosophy Chair: Natalie Beltz (IUPUI)	Law and Rights Chair: Jonathan Maci (Ivy Tech Comm College)
2:15-3:10	“Sartre and Looking Past to Societal Roles” Speaker: Eric Hamm (Purdue University) Commenter: Ashley Matney (Purdue University)	“Interpreting Hobbes and Locke in Light of Plato’s <i>Republic</i> ” Mark Erste (Franciscan Univ of Steubenville) Susan Purviance (University of Toledo)
3:15-4:10	“Duration in Special Relativity: Bergson-Einstein” Speaker: Jeremy Proulx (Eastern Michigan University) Commenter: Michael Persinger (Ivy Tech Community College)	“Law’s Commitment to Rights” Alexis Dyshkant (University of Illinois) John Ahrens (Hanover College)
4:15-5:10	<u>Undergraduate Essay Winner</u> “Theorizing the Sex Wars: An Analysis and Rejoinder” Speaker: Aaron Thieme (IPFW) Commenter: Ben Rogers (Ball State University)	“The Moral Order of Commitment” Taylor Rogers (Indiana Univ Bloomington) Zac Ferrell (Indiana Univ Bloomington)
5:20-6:45	Keynote Address, Gallahue Hall 101 “Cognition, at any scale?” Colin Allen Indiana University Bloomington	
7:00	Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)	

Saturday, 22 March	Session A 242 Jordan Hall	Session B 236 Jordan Hall
8:15-9	<i>Registration</i>	
	Special Session: Ancient Philosophy I Chair: Tiberiu Popa (Butler University)	Metaphysics Chair: Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
9-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Archytas and Aristotle on the Sovereign Living Law" Jeffrey Gower (Villanova University) Kevin Miles (Earlham College)	"Cartesian Mechanism in Medical Practice" T.J. Kohlrust (Franciscan Univ of Steubenville) Kris Rhodes (Martin University)
10-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Aristotle on the Accuracy of Perception: Phantasia Akribês" Noell Birondo (Wichita State University) Alain Ducharme (DePauw University)	"Anti-Inflationism about Truth, Deflated" Cory Wright (Cal State Long Beach) Mark Satta (Purdue University)
11-11:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Aristotle on Comedy" Paul Schollmeier (UNLV) Jonathan Evans (University of Indianapolis)	"Why We Don't Have to Live Tegmark's Duplicate Prediction" Chapman Water and Mark Satta (Purdue Univ) Mark Fendry (IUPUI)
12-1:45	<i>Lunch and Business Meeting</i>	
1:45-2	<i>Student Awards Presentation</i>	
	Special Session: Ancient Philosophy II Chair: Paul Schollmeier (UNLV)	Ethics Chair: Eric Herod (IUPUI)
2-2:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Republic 382a-d: False Words, True Souls, and The Primacy of the Practical" Nicholas Baima (Washington Univ - St. Louis) Lewis Cassity (Antioch College)	"Moral Reasons and the Paradox of Deontology" Christa Johnson (Ohio State University) Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis)
3-3:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Socrates and the Stoic Sage" Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast) Nicholas Baima (Washington Univ - St. Louis)	"Empathy as Affective Perspective Taking" David Schwan (Bowling Green State University) Abraham Schwab (IPFW)
4-4:55 Speaker: Commenter:	"Relation between Socratic Elenchus and Aristotelian Dialectic" Michele Anik Stanbury (Univ of Notre Dame) Adriel Trott (Wabash College)	"The Donohue-Levitt hypothesis examined again" Sam Kahn (IUPUI) Adam Hayden (IUPUI)

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Abstracts of Presented Papers

Title: Unconcealing Degas' Dancers in Blue: Entwining Heidegger and De Beauvoir to Create an Ethical Aesthetics

Author: Stephanie Lee

Abstract: In *Le deuxième sexe*, Simone de Beauvoir says that the greatest female authors "fail to break the ropes that hold them back." This, I argue, is an unfair criticism. These women were successful for their time, and more importantly in appropriating works of art for one's present project individuals are able re-create (in the Heideggerian sense) meaning toward the continued realization of freedom in accord with Beauvoir's ethical theory. Taking *Dancers in Blue* by Edgar Degas, an artist commonly understood as misogynistic, I offer an example of this process of appropriation in an effort to counteract the "failure" Beauvoir finds.

Title: A Foucauldian-Feminist Ethics of Care

Author: Richard Lynch

Abstract: In this paper I argue that Foucault's and the feminists' articulations of "ethics of care" are in fact complementary, and that their contrasting frameworks and perspectives in fact *strengthen* each other—suggesting positive directions forward for the development of a critical social theory. After initially outlining some structural parallels between feminists' and Foucault's ethics of care, I focus on Carol Gilligan's intellectual trajectory *since* the 1982 publication of *In a Different Voice*. Responding to critics within the feminist tradition as well as to her own research in the intervening decades, Gilligan reorients her understanding of an ethics of care in an explicitly political direction, emphasizing its critical capacity as a source and site for, as the book's title suggests, *resistance*. This movement fits with, and can be sharply amplified by the tools and perspectives that grew out of Foucault's work on power relations.

Title: Modality and Mousetraps: Evolution and Accessibility

Author: Jason Zinser

Abstract: Intelligent Design theory is a modern reformulation of the argument from design that claims that Darwinian evolution cannot explain certain features of the biological world. Rather than attacking particular claims of ID theory, I will identify a flaw in the underlying structure of the theory. Namely, I will argue that the sense of irreducible complexity that is required by ID theory is not empirical. I will offer a thought experiment to motivate this claim. Also, I will criticize overreaching by naturalistic philosophers regarding the accessibility of possible organisms or traits.

Title: Higher-Order Belief Views of Justified Suspended Judgment

Author: Peter Murphy

Abstract: Under what conditions are suspended judgments justified? This paper looks at one answer, the higher-order belief view. This view says that suspending judgment about *p* is justified just in case a higher-order belief about one's epistemic situation with respect to *p* is justified. One higher-order belief

that might play this role is the belief that all of one's other doxastic options with respect to p (namely believing p , disbelieving p , or having some particular credence regarding p) would be unjustified. After motivating and explicating this view, and distinguishing various versions of it, I argue that the most plausible version of it falls to an objection that parallels a standard objection to the KK principle.

Title: Sartre and Looking Past Societal Roles

Author: Eric Hamm

Abstract: Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy is rightly divided by critics into earlier ontological writings and later political philosophy. However, Sartre's hesitance to apply the ontological concepts in *Being and Nothingness* to *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as well as his lack of political commentary in the former work leaves his readers with two incomplete understandings of the world. In this paper, I attempt to inject a degree of the political into Sartre's famous concept of "the look," coming to the conclusion that the roles one plays in society directly affects an individual's possibility of objectification. Ultimately, these societal positions prove to be aspects of individual existence that can allow for the ontological possibility of deflecting the objectifying look through an individual's distancing of one's possibilities from one's present circumstances.

Title: Duration in Special Relativity: Bergson-Einstein

Author: Jeremy Proulx

Abstract: Henri Bergson made some famous errors in his interpretation of time in relativity, errors that contributed both to Bergson's philosophy being discredited in the eyes of science, and to the more general eclipse of 'Bergsonism' in continental philosophy. Now that Bergsonism has reentered the continental scene, it is time to reassess Bergson's interpretation of relativity. I argue that despite some serious errors Bergson has a valuable contribution to make to the understanding of time in relativity. With reference to the twins paradox, I show how Bergson can help us to avoid the fallacious view that special relativity leads to a 'block-time' view of the universe. I also show that Bergson's view is consistent with recent interpretations of time in special relativity. My general claim is that Bergson helps us to see that time lapse is the lived time that is invariant to change of inertial frame.

Title: Interpreting Hobbes and Locke in Light of Plato's *Republic*

Author: Mark Erste

Abstract: Despite the historical gap between them, the ethical-political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke have major similarities to Plato's description of oligarchy in the *Republic*. Plato depicts the beliefs, motives, and likely actions of an oligarchy and of an individual whose soul is formed based on these principles. Interestingly the central tenets of this picture as Plato paints it are all present as central motivating factors in the theories of Hobbes and Locke. Analysis of these similarities will aid in the comparison of the ancients with the moderns and of Hobbes with Locke. Further, it will enhance our understanding of these enlightenment political theories by showing them to be expressions of an oligarchic worldview. This paper aims to bring out these similarities by discussing the central tenets of

oligarchy as Plato presents them and then showing how these tenets resurface in the thought of Hobbes and Locke.

Title: Law's Commitment to Rights

Author: Alexis Dyshkant

Abstract: Evan Fox-Decent argues that the rule of law is incompatible with gross human rights violations, such as slavery. Legal Positivists, such as Raz, believe the rule of law must only guide behavior and that a legal system can successfully guide behavior without human rights laws. Fox-Decent aims to show that the principle of guiding behavior is itself not neutral to human rights. Fox-Decent attempts to show necessary connection between the rule of law and human rights law through a chain of inferential steps, "commitment to the internal morality entails respect for human agency, respect for human agency entails respect for human dignity, and respect for human dignity entails respect for human rights." I argue that Fox-Decent fails to adequately defend this chain of inferences and, thus, fails to show that a Fullerian account of law is committed to human rights legislation.

Title: Moral Order of Commitment

Author: Taylor Rogers

Abstract: Over the past 30 years numerous philosophers have used recalcitrance as a dialectical weapon. They argue that examining recalcitrance reveals the inadequacy of their opponents' theories of emotion. Despite this dialectical use, no one has yet provided a clear and convincing account of recalcitrance. In this paper, I provide a detailed analysis of recalcitrance. I highlight features previously overlooked in the literature and I identify some necessary and sufficient conditions regarding what it takes for an emotion to be recalcitrant. This analysis clarifies the concept, which will allow the dialectic to progress in a more explicit, unified, and systematic fashion.

Keynote Address Title: Cognition, at any scale?

Author: Colin Allen

Abstract: Paradigmatic cognitive science has always been about human cognition. But not all cognitive scientists limit their attention to the cognitive capacities of the not quite 10^{11} neurons embedded within the roughly 10^{16} cells that comprise the human body. Cognitive approaches have been advocated for much smaller and simpler systems, as well as for the much larger aggregations of agents into social groups. I will survey a range of natural and artificial systems which some cognitive scientists have considered to be cognitive systems in their own right, including single cells, "minimally cognitive" dynamical agents, spinal cords, nonhuman animals, "hive minds", human social groups, and socio-technological hybrids. In doing so I will assess arguments for and against the conservative view that cognition is a natural phenomenon that manifests itself only within a relatively narrow range of scales, being emergent at the lower end -- perhaps around the scale of 10^6 neurons (cf. honeybees) or 10^8 million (cf. cephalopods) -- and "demergent" in larger systems that have cognitive agents as parts.

Title: Archytas and Aristotle on the Sovereign Living Law

Author: Jeffrey Gower

Abstract: This essay opens up a bio-political perspective on Aristotle's account of political rule by establishing a structural homology between Archytas's conception of the sovereign as a living law and Aristotle's conception of the supremely virtuous king as a law unto himself. I first offer a bio-political reading of Archytas's *On Law and Justice* that shows how the sovereign's embodying the law bridges the gap between law and life and inscribes the singular lives of citizens into the universal meshes of the law. Following recent scholarship that affirms the authenticity of *On Law and Justice*, I then establish the homology and argue that it can be attributed to an Archytean influence on Aristotle. The structural homology between these two conceptions of the sovereign and the likelihood that Aristotle responds to an authentic Archytean precedent suggest that Aristotle's supremely virtuous king plays a bio-political role similar to the sovereign living law.

Title: Aristotle on the Accuracy of Perception: *Phantasia Akribês*

Author: Noell Birondo

Abstract: In this paper I consider an apparently problematic remark that Aristotle makes at *De Anima* 428a11-15 regarding the difference between *phantasia* and *aisthêsis*. What he says in this passage is that: "it is not when we are exercising our senses accurately (*akribôs*) with regard to objects of perception that we say that this appears (*phainetai*) to us to be a man, but when we do not perceive it distinctly (*enargôs*)." On one extremely natural way of taking this remark, the claim appears to commit Aristotle to the view that certain straightforward cases of veridical perception are not cases of perception at all. This is because *aesthêsis* is here contrasted with *phantasia*, in such a way that *aesthêsis* appears not to be responsible for the episode of *phantasia* invoked in the passage. That would apparently mean that in a case in which someone indistinctly, but nevertheless correctly, takes something to be a man, her experience does not amount to a genuine case of perception, strictly so called, at all. And taking the remark in this natural way seems to preclude unmediated epistemological contact with ordinary objects of perception, inviting the distinctively modern forms of epistemological skepticism to which some commentators have thought Aristotle to be (maybe even especially) immune.

Title: Aristotle on Comedy

Author: Paul Schollmeier

Abstract: My purpose is to present what is more likely than not the Aristotelian concept of comic action and its catharsis. I shall draw a parallel between tragedy and comedy and show that the tragic emotions and their catharsis rest on ethical presuppositions of a general nature that can also serve the comic emotions and their catharsis. My contention is that a pitiable and fearful action and a ridiculous and shameful action can have a capacity to function in a manner surprisingly and profoundly similar.

Title: Cartesian Mechanism in Medical Practice

Author: T.J. Kohlrust

Abstract: This paper attempts to elucidate the effect that Descartes philosophy of the human person has had on the practice of modern Western medicine, particularly with respect to his philosophy of the mechanistic aspects of the body. I argue that this mechanistic philosophy leads in a direct manner to two issues which are currently undermining a proper practice of medicine: the over-specialization of roles and the dehumanization of the patient. In response to these problems, I contend that there must be a shift in the roles of doctors back towards that of the general practitioner as well as a paradigm shift in the standard model of the human person from the corpse to the living patient.

Title: Anti-Inflationism about Truth, Deflated

Author: Cory Wright

Abstract: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. While traditional inflationism has its share of problems, we should be no less wary of minimalism. Its main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and the reversal legitimate, minimalists’ adequacy thesis is implausibly strong.

Title: Why We Don’t Have to Live Tegmark’s Duplicate Prediction

Authors: Chapman Water and Mark Satta

Abstract: Physicist Max Tegmark claims that the currently favored cosmological model predicts that we have duplicates, infinitely many in fact, currently living on other planets throughout the multiverse. He also claims that the lives of these duplicates “will typically begin to differ eventually.” such that while you continue reading this paper, one of your duplicates, whose life up until this point has been indistinguishable to yours, decides to stop reading and do something else. The Duplicate Prediction (TDP) is the position that (1) you have infinitely many “duplicates” and (2) that the lives of these duplicates will typically begin to differ eventually. In this paper we argue that not only are there are good reasons to deny many of the commitments Tegmark uses to establish TDP, but that, even when granted, these commitments fail to show that TDP is true.

Title: Republic 382a-d: False Words, True Souls, and The Primacy of the Practical

Author: Nicholas Baima

Abstract: In Book II at 382a-d, Socrates distinguishes between a "true" or "real" falsehood and a "mixed" falsehood. True falsehoods are always bad, whereas mixed falsehoods are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates' insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. This provokes the question: what is a true falsehood and how does it differ from a mixed falsehood? And more broadly, what exactly is Plato's attitude towards falsehood? In this paper I shall argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics. They are false beliefs about how one

should act. I call these "normative beliefs". False normative beliefs are pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. In contrast, mixed falsehoods are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. Surprisingly, mixed falsehoods can be beneficial even when they are about seemingly important Platonic things, as long as they produce a true normative belief. The upshot of this is that practical concerns have primacy

Title: Socrates and the Stoic Sage

Author: Leigh Viner

Abstract: There are few moral systems in Western philosophy as extreme and paradoxical as that of the Stoics, and few moral paradigms as controversial as the Stoic sage. The Stoics advocated the extirpation of the passions, the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and the equality of sins, claiming that all who fall short of moral perfection are equally vicious. They embodied these radical doctrines in the figure of the sage, an exemplar whose self-sufficiency, self-mastery, virtue, and knowledge were so complete that he differed from the gods only in his mortality, provoking both ancient and modern critics of Stoicism to dismiss him as an impracticable and unappealing ideal. In this paper, I attempt to add depth and richness to an understanding of the sage, by examining how the Stoics' idealized paradigm derives from, or maps onto, the figure of Socrates, with special attention to his characteristic irony.

Title: Relation between Socratic Elenchus and Aristotelian Dialectic

Author: Michelle Anik Stanbury

Abstract: In this essay I examine the common approach to the comparison between Socratic elenchus and Aristotelian dialectic, which portrays Aristotelian dialectic as a more logically refined, but pedagogically impersonal, version of Socratic dialectic. This approach, I argue, fails to recognize that the two versions of dialectic are intended for different interlocutor-types and thus have different pedagogical goals. Socratic elenchus, based in particular on Plato's *Sophist* 230b-e, is an application of dialectic directed towards *potential* philosophers, with the goal of making the interlocutor aware of his state of ignorance. Aristotelian dialectic, at least in its philosophic application, is meant for philosophers who are already aware of their ignorance. This fundamental difference, I argue, can account for details such as Aristotle's having removed the requirement that the practitioners of dialectic *believe* the positions they defend; the goals being different, so too are the respective applications of dialectic of Socrates and Aristotle.

Title: Moral Reasons and the Paradox of Deontology

Author: Christa Johnson

Abstract: Nozick (1974: 30) put forth the following challenge to deontology and its constraints, which has since been dubbed the Paradox of Deontology: "How can a concern for the nonviolation of C [i.e. some deontological constraint] lead to refusal to violate C even when this would prevent other more extensive violations of C?" Some writers have argued that the purported paradox is no more than an instance of deontology's standard requirement for nonoptimific action when faced with the possibility of performing some intrinsically wrong act, such as killing an innocent. In this paper, I critique two such

strategies (Richard Brook, 2007 and Ulrike Heuer, 2011), arguing that both require deontologists to deny that agents have a sort of moral reason that we should be reluctant to set aside. I then argue that the deontologist utilize the same strategy in response to the paradox without having to sacrifice moral reasons.

Title: Empathy as Affective Perspective Taking

Author: David Schwan

Abstract: The term 'empathy' is used widely in psychology and philosophy. However, many theorists have argued that empathy involves: (i) the cognitive capacity to take the perspective of the target (ii) an affective response that may (but need not necessarily) match that of the target and (iii) a distinction between the self and the other. I will argue that we should hold a perspective-taking, non-matching account of empathy. This account avoids weaknesses in other theories and better captures important features of the contemporary empirical research on empathy. I will discuss a number of influential accounts of empathy and raise objections with each. In each case, I will present a refinement of the given criterion which I will argue successfully avoids these objections.

Title: The Donohue-Levitt hypothesis examined again

Author: Sam Kahn

Abstract: In this paper, I argue for the following two theses: (1) a plausible explanation for the correlation presupposed by the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis has not been offered and (2) the correlation between legalized abortion and lower crime rates is questionable at best. To that end, the paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I go over the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis and some of the explanations that have been made for the correlation it presupposes; in the second, I explain why the explanations just explored are implausible; in the third, I turn to the correlation itself; and in the fourth, I gesture at the move from correlation to causal mechanism in this context before making some concluding remarks.