

The Indiana Philosophical Association

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
 IUPUI Campus Center
 420 University Blvd
 Indianapolis IN 46202

Meeting Program

Friday, 11 October

	Session A Room 307	Session B Room 309
11-11:45	<i>Registration</i>	
11:45-12	<i>Welcome</i>	
	Language Chair: Eric Dalton (Southern Indiana)	Induction and Group Inquiry Chair: Jared Bates (Hanover)
12-12:55	"Different Kinds of Names"	"Peer Disagreement and Group Inquiry"
Speaker:	Eric Snyder (Ohio State)	Jeff Dunn (DePauw)
Commenter:	Bernd Buldt (IPFW)	Peter Murphy (Indianapolis)
1-1:55	"Words on Psycholinguistics"	"A Modest Solution to the Problem of Induction"
Speaker:	Wade Munroe (Indiana-Bloomington)	Paul Draper (Purdue)
Commenter:	Samantha Ooley (IUPUI)	Timothy Lyons (IUPUI)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break with Refreshments</i>	
	Moral Philosophy Chair: Taylor Rogers (Indiana-Bloomington)	Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy Chair: Susan Purviance (Toledo)
2:15-3:10	"Defending the Possible Consent Interpretation from Actual Objections"	"Witches and Unicorns: the Case against Human Rights"
Speaker:	Sam Kahn (IUPUI)	Renaud-Philippe Garner (Toronto)
Commenter:	Jonathan Surovell (Pittsburgh)	John Ahrens (Hanover)
3:15-4:10	"Revisiting Frankfurt On Sufficiency"	"Rawlsian Stability"
Speaker:	Graham Valenta (Rice)	John Garthoff (Tennessee)
Commenter:	Eric Herod (IUPUI)	Emmalon Davis (Indiana-Bloomington)
4:15-5:10	"Just Give Me My Desires"	"Three Arguments Showing the Law's Essential (Real) Normativity"
Speaker:	Brandon Williams (Rice)	Michael Young (JD, Ohio State)
Commenter:	Kassandra David (Toledo)	Henry Kreuzman (Wooster)
5:10-5:20	<i>Break</i>	
5:20-6:45	Keynote Address "Reasonableness" Marcia Baron Indiana University/University of St. Andrews	
7:00	<i>Dinner</i>	

Saturday, 12 October

	Session A Room 307	Session B Room 309
8:15-9	<i>Registration and Continental Breakfast</i>	
	Metaphysics Chair: Allen Gehring (Brescia)	Metaphilosophy, Self-Knowledge and the Reliability Chair: Samantha Ooley (IUPUI)
9-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Descartes on the Mind-Body Union and the Nature of the Passions” Eric Stencil (Utah Valley) Aaron Wells (Notre Dame)	“Human Evolution and Cognitive Reliability” Michael J. Deem (Notre Dame) Sam Kahn (IUPUI)
10-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Metaphysical Necessity and Subjective Experience: A Critique of Qualia Theories” Ben Cordry (Lorain County) Adam Bowen (Ball State)	“Meta-Philosophical Scepticism” Jimmy Licon (Maryland) Kevin Harrelson (Ball State)
11-11:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Quinean Non-Relational Realism” Jonathan Surovell (Pittsburgh) Chad Carmichael (IUPUI)	“Expression and the Grounds of Self-Knowledge” Casey Doyle (Pittsburgh) Georgi Gardiner (Rutgers)
12-1:45	<i>Lunch and Business Meeting</i>	
1:45-2	<i>Student Awards Presentation</i>	
	The Discipline of Philosophy Chair: Juli Thorson (Ball State)	Testimony and Disagreement Chair: Stephanie VanWye-Lee (Toledo)
2-2:55	“Special Panel on Inclusivity in Philosophy” Moderator: Juli Thorson (Ball State) Speakers: Emmalon Davis (Indiana-Bloomington); Adriel Trott (Wabash)	“Knowing For: A New Path in Testimonial Justification” Speaker: John Camacho (Missouri-SL) Commenter: Kevin Lepore (Missouri-SL)
3-3:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Professional Ethics, Pragmatism, and Moral Motivation” Daniel Hartner (Rose-Hulman) Allen Gehring (Brescia)	“On Klein’s Argument for Infinitism” Brendan Murday (Ithaca) Kris Rhodes (Martin)
4-4:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“The Stereotype Threat Hypothesis: An Assessment from the Philosopher’s Armchair” Gina Schouten (Illinois State) Leigh Viner (Indiana Southeast)	“Disagreement, Realism, and Nihilism” Jonathan Fuqua (Purdue) Stephanie VanWye-Lee (Toledo)

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Abstracts of papers:

Friday session I: Early Afternoon

Different Types of Names (Eric Snyder, Ohio State)

Abstract: Names are used in a variety of ways, namely referentially, predicatively, and adjectively. However, the predominant dialectic regarding names has it that names are exclusively referential-type or predicative-type expressions. The former view is known as Referentialism, the latter as Predicativism. I review the linguistic evidence in favor of these prominent views, their advocates, and their problems. Neither view can account for adjectival uses of names, and the increasingly popular Predicativism has several heretofore unmentioned, independent problems. I want to reintroduce an alternative to these two prominent positions. I call it "Type Polysemy". According to it, names take on different semantic types in different syntactic environments thanks to a limited stock of independently needed type-shifting principles originally provided in a classic paper by Barbara Partee. The result is an empirically superior account of names which elegantly explains why they, like other nouns, have the various uses witnessed.

Words on Psycholinguistics (Wade Munroe, Indiana – Bloomington)

Abstract: I argue that David Kaplan's analysis of the factors that determine what words (if any) someone has used in a given utterance is inconsistent with models of speech planning in psycholinguistics as informed by data on slips-of-the-tongue.¹ Kaplan explicitly aims to formulate a theory of words that elides the details of the process responsible for speech planning and production and, thus, ignores the relevant, psycholinguistic literature. Kaplan's reliance on the intentions of speakers in his account leads to two specific problems: (1) his theory will deliver incorrect answers about what words have been said in word intrusion errors (slips in which a different word than the one intended enters the speech planning process), and (2) in certain errors involving sub-word units (e.g., morphemes, phonemes, etc.).

A Modest Solution to the Problem of Induction (Paul Draper, Purdue)

Abstract: I take the "problem of induction" to be the hard skeptical problem of justifying ampliative inference. To solve this problem, one must identify a good internal epistemic reason to trust at least one ampliative inference, and that reason must not depend on trusting] any other ampliative inference, even if that other inference is of a different sort. On this construal of the problem, pragmatic justifications of induction cannot solve it because they are not epistemic, abductive justifications of induction cannot solve it because abductive reasoning is ampliative, and externalist justifications of induction cannot solve it because the justifiers externalists propose are not internal. Indeed, it is widely thought that, so construed, the problem of induction simply *cannot* be solved. Here I suggest otherwise, proposing a conditional solution to the problem and then explaining why the crucial condition might very well be satisfied.

Peer Disagreement and Group Inquiry (Jeff Dunn, DePauw)

Abstract: Conciliationism is the view that epistemic peers, upon finding they disagree about some proposition, should move their opinions on that proposition towards each other. I argue that Conciliationism conflicts with a modest epistemic principle that says we should believe with respect to some proposition in a way that we know

is most likely to lead us to a true belief with respect to that proposition. That Conciliationism is in conflict with this modest epistemic principle follows from psychological evidence that groups of inquirers are often more accurate than individual inquirers, but only when these groups contain members that believe and defend different viewpoints.

Friday Session II: Late Afternoon

Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual objections (Sam Kahn, IUPUI)

Abstract: Pallikkathayil's recent "Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity" has two main goals: (1) to discredit the so-called possible consent interpretation of Kant's Formula of Humanity (FH) and (2) to advance her own interpretation of FH. Now I would like to respond to the first part of Pallikkathayil's project. There are two main proponents of the possible consent interpretation of FH: O'Neill and Korsgaard. In what follows, I shall argue for the following two theses: (1) Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation does not work against O'Neill, for O'Neill's version of this interpretation is flexible enough to allow some kinds of deception, force and coercion and (2) Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation does not work against Korsgaard, for the attack simply does not address Korsgaard's response to the idea that it might be counterintuitive to say that all actions that rely on force, coercion and deception for their nature are impermissible.

Revisiting Frankfurt on Sufficiency (Graham Valenta, Rice)

Harry Frankfurt's "Equality as a Moral Ideal" is an important piece that developed the sufficiency view as a rival to egalitarianism and prioritarianism in discussions of distributive justice. I argue in this paper that, despite the importance of Frankfurt's article, the sufficiency view that Frankfurt develops has been prominently misinterpreted. Utilizing Paula Casal's discussion of Frankfurt in her article "Why Sufficiency is Not Enough" as an example of this misinterpretation, I claim that what counts as enough—Frankfurt's sufficiency threshold—is an entirely subjective, all-or-nothing form of contentment. One is wholly content or not content at all. Thus, because the threshold is the upper limit, there is nothing to be said about what happens above the threshold. Furthermore, because all that justice demands is that we maximize the incidence of sufficiency, very little can be said about how we ought to go about bringing people up to the threshold level.

Just Give Me My Desires (Brandon Williams, Rice)

Abstract: I argue that Simple Desire Satisfactionism should be preferred over Corrected Desire Satisfactionism because the latter fails to provide meaningful results at the crucial point of disagreement between the two theories. I first provide reasoned analyses of Simple and Corrected Desire Satisfactionism. Then, taking Robert Noggle's theory of Corrected Desire Satisfactionism as my opponent, I show that the key difference between these theories lies in their treatment of prudential desires. I then offer an analysis of "core desires" and show that it is not possible for any subject to move from those core desires to corrected desires. Since we are all epistemically cut off from our own corrected desires, we are unable to take their corrected status into account when we deliberate. Thus, the very point at which Corrected Desire Satisfactionism diverges from Simple Desire Satisfactionism is the point at which it is unable to offer any assistance.

Witches and Unicorns: the Case against human Rights (Renaud-Philippe Garner, Toronto)

Abstract: This essay argues that human rights are falsely universal and thus cannot serve as the objective standard to judge conventional moralities. This essay follows and expands Alasdair MacIntyre's argument against human rights. MacIntyre argued that human rights are falsely universal and that they are nothing more than the moral claims of a particular tradition. This essay defends his claim against an objection by J.B. Scheewind, who though sympathetic to MacIntyre's anti-foundationalism, rejects his conclusions. The argument central to this criticism of human rights is an examination of moral discourse and how the use of moral notions ultimately relies on the normative framework in which such notions are at home. Further, the argument aims to show that the proper framework for the use of a moral notion is the framework for its genesis. Since no moral framework can claim universal standing, this essay concludes that human rights are falsely universal.

Rawlsian Stability (John Garthoff, Tennessee)

Despite great advances in recent scholarship on the political philosophy of John Rawls, Rawls's conception of stability is not fully appreciated. This essay aims to help remedy this by articulating a more complete understanding of stability and its role in Rawls's theory of justice. I argue that even in *A Theory of Justice* Rawls (i) maintains that within liberal democratic constitutionalism judgments of relative stability often adjudicate decisively among conceptions of justice and (ii) is committed to (i) more deeply than to the substantive content of justice as fairness. This essay thus emphasizes the continuity of Rawls's thought over time and motivates the position that Rawlsian stability is as philosophically significant and distinctively Rawlsian as justice as fairness itself.

Three Arguments Showing the Law's Essential (Real) Normativity (Michael Young, JD Ohio State)

Abstract: This paper offers three arguments to show that we ordinary legal subjects think that the law is essentially normative in the interesting sense of being itself a grounding source of reason or genuine practical oughts. This implies that we have a category of thought which regards the law as really (non-instrumentally) normative. Insofar as legal positivism is defined or dependent upon denying such normativity, then positivism could not possibly have the conceptual resources for providing a philosophical account of such a thought-category. If this thought-category cannot be reduced or eliminated, then the positivist must admit that her theory necessarily denies her own unavoidable categories of thought. Given that we want our philosophical theories to make sense of the irreducible and ineliminable categories of thought we actually have as the very categories they are, this exposes a fundamental deficiency or cost for maintaining any ordinary sort of positivist legal theory.

Session III: Saturday Morning

Descartes on the Mind-Body union and the Passions (Eric Stencil, Utah Valley)

In this paper, I defend two central components of the 'traditional' interpretation of Descartes, namely mind-body substance dualism and an account of the mind-body union wherein the mind and the body causally interact through the pineal gland. While this may not seem a surprising thesis, this traditional interpretation of Descartes has come under much fire in recent years. Prominent scholars including Margaret Wilson and Ruth Mattern have argued that Descartes failed to consistently maintain the pineal gland account of the mind-body

union while Tad Schmaltz and John Cottingham have argued that he did not maintain a strict substance dualism. I defend the traditional reading of Descartes on both of these counts by examining several passages from the *Meditations*, *Principles of Philosophy* and the *Passions of the Soul* that these scholars use as evidence of Descartes' giving up on these two theses and argue that these passages provide no such evidence.

Metaphysical Necessity and Subjective Experience: A Critique of Qualia Theories (Ben Cordry, Lorraine County)

Abstract: The qualitative dimension of consciousness is alleged by some philosophers to pose a problem to a comprehensive physicalism: physical reality cannot in principle give rise to the distinctive, subjective "what it feels like" of consciousness. Naturalists who think this way tend to address the problem by adding some additional ingredient to reality that accounts for feelings - they construct "physicalism plus" theories: while cognition supervenes on the physical, qualia, the "raw feels" of conscious experience, do not. Against this I shall argue that if we accept the supervenience of cognition we should also accept the supervenience of qualia.

Quinean Non-relational Realism (Jonathan Surovell, Pittsburgh)

A leading challenge to the received view of universals and particulars is a regress argument inspired by F. H. Bradley. This essay examines a popular line of response to the Bradleyan regress, viz. Non-Relational Realism (NRR), in light of Quine's (1948) metaontological insights. I argue that, given NRR's adherence to the view that a particular's exemplification of a universal can be brute fact, the regress is benign, and that NRR's non-relational conception of exemplification is therefore not required in order to avoid it. I then argue that NRR can be motivated through considerations of ontological parsimony. Having identified a positive motivation for NRR, I turn to the objection that NRR's non-relational conception of exemplification is unacceptably obscure. I interpret this conception of exemplification as a perfectly clear approach to the semantics of 'exemplify' and related expressions. This is the satisfaction semantics through which Quine divests predicates of their ontological import.

Human Evolution and Cognitive Reliability (Michael J. Deem, Notre Dame)

Abstract: Evolutionary reliabilism (ER), which roughly is the view that natural selection shaped our belief-producing mechanisms to be reliable, has faced a series of recent challenges. In this paper, I argue that consideration of certain features of human evolution suggests, at the very least, that there is no reason to doubt ER. I begin by clarifying the challenge to ER. I suggest that the challenge as it has been expressed in the literature contains a serious defect in its most crucial premise. By making the premise more precise, I show what exactly the challenge to ER amounts to and what a successful defense of ER would require. I then turn to recent attempts to answer evolutionary arguments against ER and suggest they fail to satisfy that requirement. Relying on widely accepted elements of contemporary evolutionary theory, I argue that evolutionary theory gives us good reason to think that selective forces favored human cognitive capacities that produce true beliefs about certain facts of the world. Finally, I sketch a best-case evolutionary scenario in which cognitive reliability could have evolved to extend beyond the domain of facts for which it was shaped.

Meta-philosophical skepticism (Jimmy Licon, Maryland)

Disagreement among philosophers is common. This strongly suggests that at least some philosophers have false philosophical opinions. Think of the distribution of philosophers in terms of a spectrum arranged from philosophers with mostly true philosophical beliefs on one end, those with mostly false philosophical beliefs on the other, and everyone else somewhere in-between. Call this is the reliability spectrum. It is not clear how a philosopher could reliably place themselves on the spectrum. Call this is the placement problem. This problem motivates meta-philosophical scepticism: we have some reason to withhold ascent to philosophical claims, they might otherwise believe, as it is an inscrutable matter where we are on the reliability spectrum.

Expression and the Grounds of Self-Knowledge (Casey Doyle, Pittsburgh)

Abstract: In this paper I do three things. First, I link our capacity for non-inferential, non-observational self-knowledge to our capacity for self-expression: true and sincere avowals (self-ascriptions that are expressions of such self-knowledge) express the states they ascribe. Second, focusing on expressive behavior, I defend a perceptual account of knowledge of other minds. Expressions of first-order mental states enable suitably placed observers to perceive that a subject is in that state. Third, I argue that this puts a constraint on theories of self-knowledge, a constraint that a number of recent accounts that draw on the “transparency” of the mental cannot meet.

Session IV: Saturday Afternoon

Professional Ethics, Pragmatism, and Moral Motivation (Daniel Hartner, Rose-Hulman)

Two contemporary trends in higher education—the call for more ethics training for preprofessional students and skepticism about the value of philosophy and the liberal arts to colleges and universities—are inconsistent and reflect confusion among nonspecialists about the nature of ethics and what it has to offer students in professional programs. This confusion is, in turn, at the heart of the push for increasingly pragmatic forms of ethics education, which emphasize vocational decision scenarios, exposure to emerging technologies, and real world decision-making over traditional theoretical/philosophical approaches to ethics. While pragmatic ethics certainly has its place in professional programs, it ought to remain secondary to more traditional forms of ethics education, since the latter has more to offer by way of moral motivation. Traditional approaches do better than pragmatic approaches in supplying the link between judgment and motivation because they teach students that moral behavior is as much a matter of rationality as are scientific and economic behavior.

The Stereotype Threat Hypothesis: An Assessment from the Philosopher's Armchair (Gina Schouten, Illinois State)

According to Stereotype Threat Hypothesis (STH), fear of confirming gendered stereotypes causes women to experience anxiety in circumstances wherein their performance might potentially confirm those stereotypes, such as high-stakes testing scenarios in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) courses. This anxiety causes women to underperform, which in turn causes them to withdraw from math-intensive disciplines. STH is thought by many to account for the underrepresentation of women in STEM fields, and a growing body of evidence substantiates this hypothesis.

In considering the plausibility of STH as an explanation for women's disproportionate attrition from undergraduate philosophy programs, one is struck by dissimilarities between STEM and philosophy which appear to undermine the applicability of STH to the latter. In this paper, I argue that these dissimilarities are either merely apparent or merely apparently relevant to the plausibility of STH as an explanation for gender disparities in philosophy. If research from STEM uncovers promising strategies for confronting stereotype threat, we should think about how to apply those strategies in our introductory philosophy classrooms.

On Klein's Argument for Informatism (Brendan Murday, Ithaca)

Abstract: Peter Klein argues in a number of publications that an informatist theory of epistemic justification is a better solution to the epistemic regress problem than its foundationalist and coherentist competitors. He argues that foundationalists are imperiled by a dilemma, and that once we distinguish between justification-emergent coherentism and justification-transmission coherentism, both can be rejected: the latter is properly characterized as an instance of foundationalism, while the former is implausible. Justification-emergent informatism is thus the last view standing, and hence the view we should endorse. We argue that Klein's argument is just as successful against his own view as it is against his foundationalist and coherentist rivals. Those who accept his premises should opt instead for the more radical justification-transmission version of informatism.

Knowing For: A New Path in Testimonial Justification (John Camacho, Missouri-Saint Louis)

Abstract (149 words): John Greco holds that any satisfactory theory of testimonial knowledge must explain its practical nature ; (1) fact that testimony pervades widely across our knowledge (2) fact that much of our knowledge depends upon testimony. The goal of a theory of testimonial justification is supposed to capture both practical facts of testimony. In §1, I'll outline the reductionist and non-reductionist theories of testimonial justification. In §2, Greco offers six cases: children from their mothers, teachers (simple), friends, citizens (tricky), job interviewers and interrogators (difficult). He turns these cases into the Reasons and Trust Dilemma: reductionism fails to explain the practical fact that testimony pervades in simple cases and non-reductionism fails to explain the fact that testimony must be dependable in difficult cases. In §3, I propose Case 7 in order to show how hearers' aims for knowing are related to testimonial justification in an effort to solve Greco's RT Dilemma

Disagreement, Realism, Nihilism (Jonathan Fuqua, Purdue)

There is a dilemma of sorts for those moral nihilists or antirealists who use the fact of moral disagreement to try and defeat moral realism. The dilemma stems from the assumption underlying such attempts: that the psychological evidence consisting of others' moral beliefs is relevant to a determination of the truth of moral realism. The dilemma is this: if the psychological evidence does count, then the evidence provided by moral disagreement is offset by the evidence provided by another psychological fact – that most people are moral realists. If the psychological evidence does not count, then of course moral disagreement cannot count against realism any more than moral agreement can count against nihilism.