

INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Spring 2012 Meeting
20 and 21 April 2012

Peeler Art Center
DePauw University
Greencastle, Indiana

Friday, 20 April

	Session A Peeler 103	Session B Peeler Auditorium
11:30-12	<i>Registration, Peeler Center Lobby</i>	
	Philosophy of Logic Chair: Charles McCarty, Indiana University	Metaphysics Chair: Jared Bates, Hanover College
12-12:55	"Why Not a Theory of Meaning?" Speaker: Matthew Carlson, Indiana University Comments: Marthe Chandler, DePauw University	"Ontological Objections to Cohen's Relationalism" Iris Spoor, University of Cincinnati Ty Fagan, Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1-1:55	"Bivalence, Theories of Truth, Aristotle, and Lukasiewicz" Speaker: Alison Mirin, Mills College Comments: Bernd Buldt, Indiana U Purdue U - Fort Wayne	"The Problem of Second Effects" Jeff Engelhardt, Siena Heights University Ian Harmon, Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1:55-2:15	<i>Break</i>	
	Justice and Moral Repair Chair: Cheryl Hughes, Wabash College	Defenses of Moral Realism Chair: Eric Dalton, University of Southern Indiana
2:15-3:10	"Restricting Justice and the Coercive Apparatus of Society" Speaker: Gina Schouten, University of Wisconsin Comments: John Ahrens, Hanover College	"Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" Michael J. Deem, University of Notre Dame Brandon Williams, Northern Illinois University
3:15-4:10	"Forgiveness as a Way of Pushing Forward" Speaker: Susan Henry, University at Albany Comments: Brandon Gordon, Kent State University	"Moral Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive" Jeff Behrends, University of Wisconsin Erik Wielenberg, DePauw University
4:15-5:10	"The Problematic Nature of Amnesty" Speaker: Danielle E. Wolfson, Univ of Texas at Austin Comments: Jeremy Anderson, DePauw University	"Moral Realism and Proper Function" Jeff Wisdom, Joliet Junior College Brad Seeman, Taylor University
5:10-5:20	<i>Break</i>	
5:20-5:30	Special Session, Peeler Auditorium 75 th Anniversary of Rudolph Carnap's visit to the IPA at DePauw, Spring 1937 Remarks by Bernd Buldt, Indiana U Purdue U - Fort Wayne	
5:30-6:45	Keynote Address, Peeler Auditorium "Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations" Margaret Urban Walker, Marquette University	

Saturday, 21 April

	Session A Peeler 103	Session B Peeler Auditorium
9-9:30am	<i>Registration, Peeler Center Lobby</i>	
	Meta-Ethics Chair: Michael J. Deem, University of Notre Dame	Early Modern Metaphysics & Epistemology Chair: Jared Bates, Hanover College
9:30-10:25	<i>“Reasons, Other-ness, and Ethical Empathy”</i>	<i>“Spinoza’s Realist Analysis of Modes”</i>
Speaker: Comments:	Kevin Houser, Indiana University Eric Hamm, Purdue University	Michael Anthony Istvan, Jr., Texas A&M Univ David Coss, Purdue University
10:30-11:25	<i>“Two Dogmas of Ethical Naturalism”</i>	<i>“What is Locke’s Theory of Sensitive Knowledge?”</i>
Speaker: Comments:	Daniel F. Hartner, Rose-Hulman Institute of Tech Jeff Behrends, University of Wisconsin	David Coss, Purdue University Ian Hegger, Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
11:30-12:25	<i>“From Internalism to Instrumentalism and its Normative Implications”</i>	<i>“Identifying the Gap in Kant’s Critical Philosophy”</i>
Speaker: Comments:	Brandon Williams, Northern Illinois University Elijah Weber, Bowling Green State University	Bryan Hall, Indiana University Southeast
12:25-2	<i>Lunch Break and Business Meeting</i>	
	Epistemology Chair: Jonathan Evans, University of Indianapolis	Chance in Physics and Biology Chair: Allen Gehring, Indiana University
2-2:55	<i>“A Meno Problem for Evidentialism”</i>	<i>“Four Conflated ‘Chance’-Like Concepts in Evolutionary Theory”</i>
Speaker: Comments:	Daniel M. Mittag, Albion College Kris Rhodes, Martin University	Charles H. Pence, University of Notre Dame Ioan Muntean, Indiana U Purdue U-Fort Wayne
3-3:55	<i>“Perception, Content, and Mystical Experience”</i>	<i>“Chancy Counterfactuals: A Critique of Hawthorne”</i>
Speaker: Comments:	Robert Carry Osborne, Univ of Illinois at U-C Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis	Renee Jorgensen, Northern Illinois University Sam Cowling, Western Michigan University

Abstracts of Presented Papers

“Bivalence, Theories of Truth, Aristotle, and Lukasiewicz,” Alison Mirin, Mills College

In *De Interpretatione* 9, Aristotle famously argues against the principle of bivalence. Lesser known is an argument that Lukasiewicz makes, which is essentially the same argument. While on the surface their arguments are about bivalence, a careful examination of their arguments shows us that their line of reasoning - in particular, their correspondence theory of truth - puts much more than bivalence at stake. This paper explores how Aristotle and Lukasiewicz, through their argument against bivalence, end up threatening (in addition to bivalence) the validity of logical principles that seem so intuitive that one may even hesitate to question even them.

“Chancy Counterfactuals: A Critique of Hawthorne,” Renee Jorgensen, Northern Illinois University

A number of authors have argued that since quantum indeterminacy results in non-zero probabilities of remarkable events, it poses a threat to Lewisian semantics of counterfactuals. Lewis proposed two criteria (remarkableness and improbability) to distance possible worlds containing such events from the world set relevant to evaluation of ordinary counterfactuals. Hawthorne leveled four objections to the criteria set, which assume that remarkableness must be a probabilistic concept. I argue that there is good reason to avoid a probabilistic construal of remarkableness, and offer an alternative understanding which avoids Hawthorne’s objections.

“Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Michael J. Deem, University of Notre Dame

My aim in this paper is to critically examine Sharon Street's 'Darwinian dilemma' for normative realism (DD). I challenge Street's claim that the normative realist cannot adequately accommodate the hypothesis that evolutionary forces have had a tremendous effect on our evaluative experience. I begin by pointing out a number of scientifically implausible commitments DD requires and proposing plausible alternatives that avoid the problems that beset Street's own adaptive link account. I then turn to the task of constructing an outline for an evolutionary behavioral theory that the realist can utilize to explain the connection between evolutionary forces and the independent normative facts he or she posits. The upshot is that it should become clear that DD does not pose a threat to normative realism and that evolutionary-behavioral theory underdetermines the choice between realism and antirealism in metaethics.

“Forgiveness as a Way of Pushing Forward,” Susan Henry, University at Albany

In this paper I explore the question of why forgiveness is morally as well as psychologically important. I expand on Margaret Urban Walker's conception of forgiveness which emphasizes the benefits provided to the victim and the moral community by its practice. Specifically contrasting this conception of forgiveness with Hannah Arendt's construction of forgiveness which focuses on the benefits provided to the wrongdoer and the larger political community, I argue that their constructions fail to fully identify the multifaceted dimensions of our experience of forgiveness. An attempt to parse out the differences between these kinds of forgiveness and how they interact with one another helps us to shed further light on how forgiveness functions in everyday as well as extraordinary situations. It will also help us to develop better methods with which we can cultivate stable, improved moral communities.

“Four Conflated ‘Chance’-Like Concepts in Evolutionary Theory,” Charles H. Pence, University of Notre Dame

Discussions of 'chance' and other related concepts (such as 'stochasticity', 'randomness', 'indeterminism', etc.) are found throughout philosophical work on evolutionary theory. By focusing on three commonly recognized distinctions, I identify four distinct 'chance'-like concepts: randomness, subjective unpredictability, causal indeterminism, and probabilistic causal processes. These are not, however, merely semantic distinctions: it is demonstrated that conflation of these clearly separate notions undermines one widely-cited argument in the philosophy of biology – in the debate over the interpretation of fitness, natural selection, and genetic drift.

“From Internalism to Instrumentalism and its Normative Implications,” Brandon Williams, Northern Illinois U

While nearly everyone accepts that following the means to one's end is a common enough example of practical reasoning, there is a crucial debate between those who hold instrumental reasoning to be the only element of practical rationality and those who maintain that other forms of reasoning must be part of the process. My present aim is to argue that instrumentalism is implied by a certain version of internalism and to explore the resulting impact on normativity in action. I first show that Williams and Korsgaard's arguments against instrumentalism fail because instrumentalism can account for deliberation as well as their own existence internalism can. I then argue that existence internalism implies instrumentalism because Williams and Korsgaard cannot account for deliberation outside the instrumental framework. Finally I show that the normativity argument against instrumentalism fails. I do so by providing a deflated view of normativity that remains able to accommodate our everyday use and practice.

“Identifying the Gap in Kant's Critical Philosophy,” Bryan Hall, Indiana University Southeast

In a letter to Christian Garve from September 21st, 1798 Kant claims that he feels the "pain of Tantalus" given the problem of effecting a "Transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics," without which there will be a "gap" in the Critical philosophy. Unfortunately, in this letter, Kant does not make clear what the gap is or how the transition is supposed to bridge the gap. Resolving these issues requires examining Kant's so-called Opus postumum, which contains unfinished drafts of Kant's transition project. In this paper, I will examine two of the more recent attempts to identify the gap and to explain the transition's role in filling the gap. I will argue that both these attempts are either textually or philosophically suspect. In contrast, I will offer a competing interpretation that avoids the problems that these other views face.

“A Meno Problem for Evidentialism,” Daniel M. Mittag, Albion College

Evidentialists analyze epistemic justification in terms of two notions: propositional justification and doxastic justification. I argue that this picture gives rise to a *Meno* problem for evidentialism. Specifically, evidentialists need to account for the additional epistemic value a doxastically justified doxastic attitude possesses as compared to a doxastic attitude that is merely propositionally justified. I consider the nature of the problem facing evidentialism and critically discuss two attempts to account for this additional epistemic value. Then, I present the alternative I favor. According to this alternative, while the *nature* of doxastic justification is analyzed in terms of propositional justification, the *value* of doxastic justification is not. Doxastic justification is more fundamentally epistemically valuable than propositional justification.

“Moral Realism and Proper Function,” Jeff Wisdom, Joliet Junior College

A common line of thought in metaethics is that certain facts about the evolutionary history of humans make moral realism implausible. Two of the most developed evolutionary cases against realism are found in the works of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. In what follows I argue that a form of moral realism that I call proper-function moral realism can meet Joyce and Street’s challenges. I begin by sketching the basics of proper-function moral realism. I then briefly sketch what I take to be the essence of Street’s and Joyce’s objections and I show how proper-function realism answers them.

“Moral Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive,” Jeff Behrends, University of Wisconsin

In this paper, I attempt to explain and respond to the evolutionary challenge for moral realism. The challenge, roughly, is that of explaining how our moral judgments could come to be adequately correlated with the moral facts, given certain evolutionary facts, and assuming the truth of moral realism. If the challenge cannot be met, then moral realists are committed to moral skepticism, and for that reason realism should be rejected in favor of some other meta-ethical position. I examine David Enoch’s (2010, 2011) proposed solution to this challenge, and argue that it is inadequate. I then argue that Enoch’s strategy can be successfully implemented in a new way. In short, I argue that, if moral realism is true, it would be a kind of fantastic coincidence if a significant amount of our evolutionarily-influenced moral judgments were *not* correctly correlated with the moral facts.

“Moral Vulnerability and The Task of Reparations,” Margaret Urban Walker, Marquette University

There is little philosophical agreement on the nature and aims of reparative justice. I seek to understand the domain and demands of reparative justice in terms of *moral vulnerability*. Significant harms raise the question of whether victims stand in truly reciprocal practices of accountability, in which they enjoy the power of calling others to account as well as bear the liability of being accountable to others. In the aftermath of harms, victims’ moral vulnerability is tested: they are exposed to the insult and injury of discovering that they do not enjoy the moral standing of holding others accountable. While the occasion of reparative justice is significant wrongs and wrongful harms and losses, the aim of reparative practices, I argue, is not only or even primarily to redress those harms and losses, but to address the moral vulnerability of victims by affirming their status in accountability relations. I draw some consequences from this view about the obligations of communities and the communicative functions of reparations as understood in recent political practice, and about how varieties of reparative effort reflect variations in kind and degree of moral vulnerability.

“Ontological Objections to Cohen’s Relationalism,” Iris Spoor, University of Cincinnati

In “Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto”, Cohen argues for, a broad, relationalist conception of color properties. Cohen holds that colors are “constituted in terms of relations between objects, viewers, and viewing conditions” (p. 487). Throughout the paper, Cohen considers a number of possible objections to his view. In this essay, I consider Cohen’s analysis of relational and nonrelational properties as exemplified in his discussion of Stroud’s objection and Cohen’s analogy between color properties and aesthetic properties like “being humorous”. First, I argue that Cohen is incorrect about our intuitions regarding color disputes. Second, I contend that Cohen’s analysis of temperature, in contrast to humor, leads to a breakdown of the distinction between relational and nonrelational properties he establishes in his response to Stroud.

“Perception, Content, and Mystical Experience: Problems in Alston’s Perceptual Analogy in *Perceiving God*,” Robert Carry Osborne, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

In his book *Perceiving God*, William Alston argues that putative mystical experience of God can provide justification for religious beliefs. His argument rests, in large part, on an analogy between regular sense perception and what he calls “mystical perception,” a kind of perception of God as being or doing so-and-so. In this paper, I will argue that there are key ways in which Alston’s analogy between the two forms of “perception” breaks down, and thus that his overall argument suffers. I will attempt to show that there are key differences in the structures of the two forms of “perception,” and that issues concerning objectivity, perceptual corroboration, and phenomenal content give us reason to believe that the perceptual analogy is ill founded. I will conclude that sense perception is able to discriminate between objective and subjective content in a way that Alston’s “mystical perception” is not.

“The Problem of Second Effects,” Jeff Engelhardt, Siena Heights University

This paper raises “The Problem of Second Effects” for the growing literature on ‘metaphysical grounding’. Just as independent causal chains that converge on a common effect overdetermine that effect, independent chains of determination—be the determination causal or non-causal—that converge on a common effect should also be overdeterminative. If so, then just as a theory is implausible if it posits systematic causal overdetermination, a theory is implausible if it posits systematic causal/non-causal overdetermination. Theories that posit systematic causal/non-causal overdetermination, however, are legion: all ‘higher-level’ causal effects result from both causal and non-causal chains of determination.

“The Problematic Nature of Amnesty: A Critical Analysis of the Role of Amnesty in Restorative Justice and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa,” Danielle E. Wolfson, University of Texas at Austin

Restorative justice has been widely discussed in various disciplines including philosophy, law, and political science as an alternative to retributive justice in societies overcoming periods of mass violence and brutality. However, the theory has been largely criticized for its practice of amnesty in exchange for testimony. Many opponents have claimed that restorative justice does not take seriously the concept of deserts and moreover fails to hold perpetrators accountable. After carefully defining restorative justice, I will seek to defend the view against these objections. I will demonstrate that restorative justice does hold perpetrators accountable despite its lack of what might be called standard or traditional retributive punishment. Furthermore, I hope to show that the practice of amnesty in exchange for testimony is an asset to restorative justice because it provides future justice on consequentialist grounds, which benefits not just individuals but is rather good for society as a whole.

“Reasons, Other-ness, and Ethical Empathy,” Kevin Houser, Indiana University

Nussbaum, Kennett, Breithaupt, Prinz, and others argue that empathy is either no help or a positive detriment to ethical relations. Overlooked in these debates: claims about whether empathy is a help or hindrance to ethical living are relative to prior substantive claims about the nature of ethical life. Recent discussions/denials of the ethical contributions of empathy all pre-suppose the same such substantive claim: ethical relations are anchored—not by what separates us, but by what we share/have in common. This thesis about ethics accepted, a natural corollary about empathy follows: empathy is ethically helpful because (i) ethics is based on what we share, and (ii) empathy is a kind of sharing—whether of feelings, imaginative positions, or identities. I’ll employ Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment, and his comments on the isolating and imperative power of suffering, to reject, then replace, this ‘sharing’ picture of ethics; I’ll then track how this shift to an other-centered ethic requires substantial changes to claims presently made about empathy’s nature and ethical function.

“Restricting Justice and the Coercive Apparatus of Society: Does Coercion Face a Special Justificatory Burden?” Gina Schouten, University of Wisconsin

Abstract: Liberalism is often criticized for its restriction of the purview of justice to the institutional mechanisms of society. One criticism of the restricted conception of justice is that the restriction cannot be given a principled justification and is thus arbitrary. Recently, some theorists have endeavored to defend a restriction of justice to the politically coercive apparatus of society against this arbitrariness objection. These theorists argue that political coercion faces a “special justificatory burden.” Because the application of principles of justice to the politically

coercive apparatus of society enables politically coercive institutions to meet that burden, restricting the purview of justice to that apparatus is non-arbitrary. My project in this paper is to demonstrate that this defense of the restriction fails. I argue that no justificatory burden applies *uniquely* to political coercion; therefore no such burden can ground a *restriction* of the purview of justice to politically coercive institutions.

“Spinoza’s Realist Analysis of Modes,” Michael Anthony Istvan, Jr., Texas A & M University

In light of his negative remarks about universals (particularly how there are no such things), Spinoza has gained a reputation, more common at certain periods of scholarship than others, for believing that no entity is able to share any degree of strict identity with any other entity, a reputation, that is, for endorsing an ontology where nothing has the intrinsic capacity to be wholly present in multiple entities at one and the same time. I argue, on the contrary, that Spinoza is a realist concerning universals. In section one, I outline three basic nominalist analyses that are possible for Spinoza to give of an entity being characterized, and make clear that these are in fact the only antirealist options. In section two, I argue that Spinoza cannot endorse any of the three nominalist analyses of a mode being characterized, and that he must in fact endorse a realist analysis. I close by pointing out two important issues that need to be solved: whether Spinoza also gives a realist analysis of substance being characterized, and how to reconcile the apparent tension between my thesis and Spinoza’s negative remarks about universals.

“Two Dogmas of Ethical Naturalism: Metaphysical Primacy and Scientific Ontology in Metaethics,” Daniel F.

Hartner, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

The term ‘naturalism’ is generally used to pick out one of two distinct claims: the metaphysical claim that all facts are natural facts, and the methodological claim that scientific methodology sets the standard for philosophical inquiry. I aim to provide support for the primacy of the methodological thesis by illuminating and ultimately rejecting two related and surprisingly ubiquitous ideas about naturalism in contemporary metaethics. The first is the idea that the metaphysical thesis is by definition the characteristic commitment of the naturalistic project in ethics. The second, upon which I think the first depends, is that science is to be demarcated by its subject matter rather than its methodology. I conclude that the first and most important step toward moving beyond the impasse characteristic of contemporary metaethics is to abandon these dogmas and reconceive of naturalism strictly in methodological terms.

“What is Locke’s Theory of Sensitive Knowledge?” David Coss, Purdue University

There is a pro tanto conflict within Locke’s epistemology. He presents his general account of knowledge stating that knowledge consists in nothing but the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. Later on, he seems to maintain that in the case of sensitive knowledge, we have knowledge beyond our own ideas. In this paper, I attempt to resolve this conflict. I first outline several approaches that have been defended in the literature. I then show that all of these views lack sufficient textual support. I then go on to argue that the best way to read Locke is as requiring a dual aspect theory of justification, whereby one must not only satisfy traditional internalist constraints on knowledge, but also externalist ones as well.

“Why Not a Theory of Meaning?” Matthew Carlson, Indiana University

In this paper I argue that the route to making progress in the epistemology of logic should not go through the development and application of a theory of meaning for the logical constants. I begin by comparing the problematics of the justification of deduction and the justification of induction. I find that the substantive theoretical disagreement in the philosophy of logic regarding which deductive inference principles are valid presents a "new riddle of deduction" analogous to Nelson Goodman's infamous new riddle of induction. In light of this, we cannot simply assume an account of what the logical constants are, nor can we assume an account of what sorts of things could be their meanings. But, by considering conceptual role semantics for the logical constants, I show that the development of a theory of meaning of the logical constants requires making precisely those assumptions.