

INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

FALL MEETING

FRANKLIN COLLEGE
FRANKLIN, INDIANA

Alumni Lounge (top floor)
Eli Lilly Campus Center

Saturday, November 4, 2000

Schedule:

- 9:30-10:00 Coffee and Refreshments
- 10:00-11:00 **Aesthetic Perception and Moral Change in Iris Murdoch's Ethics**
Ana Lita, Bowling Green State University
- 11:00-12:00 **Pleasure, Pain, and Moral Character**
Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University
- Noon: **Lunch**
- 1:30-2:00 **IPA Business Meeting**
- 2:00-4:00 **Philosophy and Other Parasitical Activity**
Michael Goldman, Miami University

Accompanying this announcement are abstracts of the papers and two maps; on the campus map the Campus Center, where the meeting will be held, has been circled.

Farin: Heidegger and Husserl on the Life-World

Early Heidegger's distinctive contribution to philosophy was his idea of the life-world. I show that Heidegger's conception is defined by the dialectics of the double danger of the loss of world and the loss of self. In the second part, I argue that Heidegger's early life-world philosophy is neither compatible with Husserl's *Ideas I* nor with *The Crisis*.

Kim: Essentially Indexical Thoughts

The phenomenon of essentially indexical thoughts has been noted for their special role played in human action. The philosophers who try to derive philosophical implications of essentially indexical thoughts, however, do not share the same insights and interest, even though they seem to. I shall demarcate the theories of these philosophers in two groups, which I shall call Two-Tier Theories and Special Thought Theories, respectively. Two-Tier Theory develops a convincing argument against Special Thought Theory. But I shall show that it also encounters a problem, which I shall call the *adaptation problem*. The problem common in both groups is that they fail to consider indexical thoughts in dynamics.

Elfin: Generating Understanding

Epistemology and philosophy of science have ignored the role of creativity in generating understanding. Creativity, it is claimed, has nothing to do with justification proper. And, after all, epistemology and philosophy of science are about justifying beliefs and theories. Yet, 'understanding' is an epistemic concept. My question is: how do we become creative problem solvers in a way that leads to understanding? What is required is to shift the focus to the epistemic character of those who hope to know and the epistemic virtues they have developed.

Sullivan: Fallacies, Lies and the Social Responsibility of Intellectuals: The Case of the Special Rights Objection

Civil-rights laws against sexual-orientation discrimination commonly face the objection that they give "special right" to lesbians and gays; the implication (often left implicit) is that these laws are unfair to heterosexuals. Two features of this objection are especially striking: its formidable rhetorical effectiveness and its demonstrable logical weakness. The discrepancy between these features cries out for explanation. In this paper I present a detailed refutation of the special-rights objection, consider some alternative explanations for the discrepancy between its popularity and its glaring unsoundness, and close with some brief reflections on the relevance of this discrepancy to the social responsibility of intellectuals.