

INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

SPRING MEETING - APRIL 6, 1974

Marian College, Indianapolis
Library Auditorium
(directions enclosed)

Department Chairmen: Please post this program notice. Graduate students are cordially invited. There is no registration fee.

- 9:15 A.M. Coffee and Doughnuts
- 10:00 "Does Recent Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" -
Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Notre Dame.
- 11:00 "Belief, Observation, and the Problem of
Objectivity" - Paul O'Connor, Concordia.
- 12:00 P.M. Lunch
- 1:15 Business Meeting
At the suggestion of Professor Richard Grabau of
Purdue University the business meeting will include
a discussion of the proposed changes in requirements
for secondary credentialing in Indiana. Of
particular concern is the proposed sharp increase
in the number of required hours in Education.
- 1:45 "A Critical Analysis of John Rawls' Theory of
Justice As Fairness" - Charles Asher, Earlham
College Senior Philosophy Major.
- 2:45 "Discrimination: Reasons and Victims" -
S. Miracchi, Ball State.

Abstracts of three of the papers are attached.

ABSTRACTS OF THE PAPERS

"Does Recent Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" - Kenneth E. Goodpaster

Some recent discussions of the main problems in moral philosophy seem to suggest that there is a mistake at the bottom of it all in that the preoccupation of moral philosophers during the last several decades with the "is/ought problem" has caused us to overlook another problem which is far more important, namely, the problem of understanding the relation between certain sorts of factual claims and reasons for action. I shall argue that either the second problem is as "verbal" as the first or that the first was not merely "verbal" to begin with. My contention is that the underlying issue, which is not verbal, is how to account for the notion of a consideration whose power is at once personal and social.

"Belief, Observation, and the Problem of Objectivity" - Paul O'Connor

The two interrelated topics I will deal with in this paper are (1) the relation of our perceptual (especially visual) processes with our beliefs and (2) the question of the objective control of our beliefs by observation. I will show that acquiring a belief about something is a necessary condition for seeing that thing, and that this analysis is not only compatible with objectivity but also helpful for a proper understanding of objectivity.

"Discrimination: Reasons and Victims" - S. Miracchi

In the recent discussion of whether the victims of discrimination deserve compensation, two puzzling disagreements have emerged. One has to do with whether the reason for an act makes a difference to whether it is an act of discrimination; the other with whether the victims of discriminations are groups or individuals. What is puzzling is that in both cases each party seems to regard his position as supported by our ordinary notion of discrimination. In this paper I shall first examine our ordinary views about discrimination and show that they reveal two different notions of discrimination. Then I shall argue that once these two notions are properly distinguished both the puzzlement and the disagreements vanish. In each case the claims made by the disputants reflect certain important truths about our notions of discrimination, which truths are compatible with each other.