

FALL MEETING 1970: INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

(FINAL NOTICE)

DATE: Saturday, October 24, 1970

PLACE: Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana

PROGRAM: 9:30 A.M. - 10:30 A.M. - Coffee and doughnuts
10:30 A.M. - 12:00 (Noon) - First paper and discussion
Noon - 1:30 P.M. - Luncheon
1:30 P.M. - 2:30 P.M. - Business meeting
2:30 P.M. - 4:00 P.M. - Second paper and discussion

Please find enclosed abstracts of the papers to be read at this meeting.

For the IPA

Paul D. Eisenberg
President

I. R. Grossmann, Perceptual Objects, Elementary Particles, and Emergent Properties.

According to common sense, perceptual objects are colored. According to the latest theory of the physicist, elementary particles are not colored. Yet perceptual objects are said to consist of elementary particles. In the view of some philosophers, these three assertions are incompatible with each other. Among these philosophers is Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars argues that we must choose between what he calls the framework of everyday and the framework of physics. He argues that perceptual objects cannot be systems of elementary particles; for if they were such systems, then they could not have such irreducible properties as colors. I try to show in this paper that Sellars' argument is not sound. I find nothing incompatible in the three assertions mentioned above. But I disagree with Sellars when he maintains that systems of entities cannot have irreducible properties. The real issue, then, is the existence of emergent properties.

II. John C. Stevens, Charles Taylor's Account of Teleological Explanation.

In chapter one of The Explanation of Behaviour, Charles Taylor claims,

- (1) Purposive behavior must be explained by teleological explanations.
- (2) It is an empirical question whether a teleological explanation holds.
- (3) If a teleological explanation of some behavior holds, then there is no non-teleological explanation of that behavior which is more basic.

From these premises, Taylor concludes that whether behavior is purposive is an empirical question.

In this paper, the author explains Taylor's account of teleological explanation. It is argued that on that account of teleological explanation (1) is false. An ambiguity in Taylor's description of teleological explanation is noted. If teleological explanations are interpreted in one way, (2) is true but (3) is false. If they are interpreted in another way (3) is true but then it is questionable whether (2) is true. It is concluded that Taylor's argument does not support the claim that it is an empirical question whether behavior is purposive.